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Abstract
The emergence of mental states from neural states by partitioning the neural
phase space is analyzed in terms of symbolic dynamics. Well-defined men-
tal states provide contexts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the
neurodynamics that can be implemented by particular partitions. This leads
to distinguished subshifts of finite type that are either cyclic or irreducible.
Cyclic shifts correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points or limit tori
whereas irreducible shifts are obtained from generating partitions of mix-
ing hyperbolic systems. These stability criteria are applied to the discussion
of neural correlates of consiousness, to the definition of macroscopic neural
states, and to aspects of the symbol grounding problem. In particular, it is
shown that compatible mental descriptions, topologically equivalent to the
neurodynamical description, emerge if the partition of the neural phase space
is generating. If this is not the case, mental descriptions are incompatible or
complementary. Consequences of this result for an integration or unification
of cognitive science or psychology, respectively, will be indicated.
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1 Interlevel Relations
Knowledge of well-defined relations among different levels of descriptions of physical
and other systems is inevitable if one wants to understand how (elements of) different
descriptions depend on each other, give rise to each other, or even imply each other.
The most ambitious program in this regard is physical reduction in the sense that
higher-level descriptions of features of a system are determined by the description
of features at the most fundamental level of physical theory, no matter how remote
the higher level is from that most fundamental level. This program assumes that
the description of all features which are not included at the fundamental level can
be constructed or derived from this level without additional input.
However, already physical examples pose serious difficulties for this program. It
has recently been proposed that the concept of contextual emergence (Atmanspacher
and Bishop, this issue; Bishop and Atmanspacher, preprint) addresses such situa-
tions more properly. Contextual emergence is characterized by the fact that lower-
level descriptions provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for higher-level
descriptions. (Note that such a relation between descriptive levels does not neces-
sarily entail the same relation between ontological levels.) The presence of necessary
conditions indicates that lower-level descriptions provide a basis for higher-level de-
scriptions, while the absence of sufficient conditions means that higher-level features
are neither logical consequences of lower-level descriptions nor can they be rigorously
derived from them alone. Hence, a full-blown reductive program is inapplicable in
these cases. Sufficient conditions for a rigorous derivation of higher-level features
can be introduced through specifying contexts reflecting the particular kinds of con-
tingency in a given situation.
A key ingredient of this procedure is the definition of some type of stability
condition (e.g., the KMS condition, due to Kubo, Martin, and Schwinger) based on
considerations required to establish the framework of a higher-level description (e.g.,
thermal equilibrium). This condition is often implemented as a reference state with
respect to which an asymptotic expansion is singular in the lower-level state space.
Its regularization defines a novel, contextual topology in which novel, emergent
features can be rigorously introduced. There is, thus, a mathematically well-defined
procedure for deriving higher-level features given the lower level description plus the
contingent contextual conditions.
Contextual emergence and the associated identification of appropriate stability
conditions may have applications in other domains such as biology and psychology,
and, ultimately, in the relationship between the physical and the mental. In this
contribution we will address a situation which is particularly difficult because it ex-
ceeds the domain of material systems: relations between brain and consciousness.
We will discuss the contextual emergence of mental states and related features (psy-
chology, cognitive science) from brain states and related features (neuroscience).
Using Harnad’s (1990) terms, this refers to the question of how mental symbols and
cognitive computation can be grounded in neurodynamics.
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More specifically, mental representations will be considered as novel features at
the (higher) level of cognition, which have necessary but not sufficient conditions at
the (lower) level of neuronal assemblies. In order to identify contexts providing such
sufficient conditions, those among the many possible cognitive features that might be
relevant or interesting as emergent features must first be identified. Assuming that
stability criteria play a role analogous to physical examples, techniques of modeling
assemblies in terms of generalized potentials with particular stability properties and
corresponding relaxation times or escape times suggest themselves. This can be
implemented for powerful modeling tools such as neural networks (Anderson and
Rosenfeld 1989) or coupled map lattices (Kaneko and Tsuda 2000).
Other interlevel relations in addition to contextual emergence are strong re-
duction, radical emergence, and supervenience (cf. Atmanspacher and Bishop, this
issue). While we do not think that strong reduction or radical emergence provide
clarifying insight for the relation between brain and consciousness, some comments
about supervenience are appropriate here. The notion of supervenience character-
izes situations in which lower-level descriptions contain sufficient but not neces-
sary conditions for higher-level descriptions. This scenario has been employed for
brain-consciousness relations in the sense that a conscious state with a particular
phenomenal content can be multiply realized at the neural level (Kim 1992, 1993).
For instance, Chalmers (2000) defines neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) as
neural systems that are correlated with conscious mental states and are minimally
sufficient for the occurence of those states.
In this definition, the notion of sufficiency rather than necessity takes into ac-
count that different neural states can be correlated with the same conscious state
(multiple realization). Our notion of contextual emergence addresses the differ-
ent question of how neural states are related to conscious states in each individual
neural realization. Contextual emergence does not address the distinction between
many-to-one and one-to-one relations but tries to elucidate principles which allow
us to understand the relationship between mental and neural states itself, even in
individual instantiations, in a more profound manner. In this way, supervenience
and contextual emergence complement rather than contradict each other. Apply-
ing both concepts together may, thus, provide additional insight into the nature of
mind-brain relations.
2 Structural Stability in Symbolic Dynamics
The issue of stability plays a prominent role in statistical mechanics. Haag et al.
(1974) have shown that Gibbs’ thermal equilibrium states are uniquely characterized
by three stability conditions upon state functionals: (i) stationarity, i.e. expectation
values of observables do not change in time; (ii) structural stability, i.e., stability of
the dynamics against perturbations; and (iii) “asymptotic abelianness”, i.e., tempo-
rally distant observables become eventually compatible (see Bratteli and Robinson
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(1997)). From these presuppositions, Haag et al. (1974) derived the KMS condition
for thermal equilibrium states. In the following we will establish related stability
criteria for symbolic dynamics.
Consider a classical time-discrete, invertible dynamical system (X,Φ) given by
a compact Hausdorff space as its phase space X and a map Φ : X → X . The
flow of the system is generated by the time iterates Φt, t ∈ Z, i.e., t 7→ Φt is a
one-parameter group for the dynamics. Then, the function space of complex-valued
continuous functions over X , A = C(X), yields a C∗-algebra of classical observables
for that dynamical system.
The states of such a C∗-dynamical system are linear, positive, normalized func-
tionals ρ : A → C. For classical dynamical systems they correspond to probability
measures µρ over the phase space X , such that ρ(f) =
∫
X
f(x) dµρ(x) for f ∈ C(X).
While pure states can be identified with single points in phase space x ∈ X , non-
pure states are statistical states given by measures µρ that are not concentrated on
a single point.
In its simplest sense, the stability of a dynamical system refers to the stability
of a point x∗ ∈ X under the flow Φt: x∗ = Φ(x∗), i.e., x∗ is a fixed-point attractor.
Limit-cycles or higher-order tori as attractors can be related to fixed points by the
technique of Poincare´ sections. In general, attractors are invariant sets A ⊂ X ,
such that Φ(A) ⊆ A and Φ−1(A) ⊆ A. This invariance property of A extends to
probability measures µ according to µ(Φ−1(A)) = µ(A) which are called stationary
or invariant measures. Likewise, a statistical state ρµ over the algebra of continuous
functions assigned to the measure µ has the invariance property. The invariance of
thermal equilibrium states is the first postulate by Haag et al. (1974).
Structural stability refers to perturbations in the function space of the flow map
Φ. The system (X,Φ) is called structurally stable if there is a neighborhood N
of Φ such that all Ψ ∈ N are topologically equivalent with Φ.1 As Haag et al.
(1974) pointed out, the concept of structural stability is closely related to that of
ergodicity. An invariant probability measure µ is said to be ergodic under the flow
Φ if an invariant set A, has either measure zero or one: µ(A) ∈ {0, 1}. If µ is
non-ergodic, there is an invariant set A with 0 < µ(A) < 1 corresponding to an
accidental degeneracy. Such degeneracies are not stable under small perturbations.
Hence, non-ergodic systems are in general not structurally stable (Haag et al. 1974).
Thermal equilibrium states are given by invariant, ergodic measures over X . Be-
yond fixed points and limit tori, more complicated attractors are mixing in addition.
Mixing refers to the loss of temporal correlations among the observables of a dynami-
cal system. Formally, a measure µ is calledmixing if |µ(A∩Φ−t(B))−µ(A)µ(B)|
t→∞
−→
0 for all measurable sets A,B (Luzzatto preprint). This property can be rephrased by
the correlation of observables f, g ∈ A at time t: Ct(f, g) = |ρµ(f ·g◦Φt)−ρµ(f)·ρµ(g)|
where ρµ is the statistical state assigned to the measure µ. If Ct(χA, χB)
t→∞
−→ 0
1Two maps Φ,Ψ are called topologically equivalent, or conjugated, if there is a homeomorphism
h such that h ◦ Φ = Ψ ◦ h.
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for characteristic functions χA, χB of the sets A,B ⊂ X , µ is mixing (Luzzatto,
preprint). Interestingly, Haag et al. (1974) derived this loss of correlations from a
more fundamental, purely algebraic stability property called “asymptotic abelian-
ness” (Bratteli and Robinson 1997). The mixing property of a state ρ follows from
the asymptotic abelianness of the algebra under the assumption that ρ is relatively
pure, i.e. ρ cannot be decomposed into a convex sum of invariant states (ρ might
be decomposable into non-invariant states, however). Relatively pure states have
sharp expectation values and correspond, therefore, to thermodynamic macrostates
(Shalizi and Moore preprint).
Stationarity (invariance), structural stability (ergodicity) and asymptotic abelian-
ness (mixing) are important for the investigation of nonlinear dynamical systems.
Many rigorous results are known for hyperbolic systems where either the whole phase
space possesses a hyperbolic structure (Anosov diffeomorphisms) or there is a hy-
perbolic attractor. Anosov diffeomorphisms are known to be structurally stable
(Robinson 1999), and systems with hyperbolic attractors have invariant, ergodic
and mixing probability measures due to a theorem by Sinai, Ruelle and Bowen (Ru-
elle 1968, 1989). For non-hyperbolic systems, much less is known (cf. Viana et al.
2003).
Now let us introduce the notion of epistemic observables. For this purpose,
consider a piecewise constant function f over the phase space X . Such a function
is generally not overall continuous and does therefore not belong to the C∗-algebra
A = C(X) of observables. Instead, it belongs to the larger W∗-algebra2 of µˆ-
essentially bounded epistemic observables L∞(X, µˆ) that are contextually defined by
a reference probability measure µˆ on the phase spaceX used for a Gel’fand-Naimark-
Segal (GNS) construction (Primas 1998, Atmanspacher and Bishop, this issue). Two
states x, y ∈ X are called epistemically equivalent with respect to f if f(x) = f(y)
(beim Graben and Atmanspacher, in press). Epistemically equivalent states are not
distinguishable by means of the observable f . The classes of epistemically equivalent
states partition the phase space X into disjoint sets Ai.
A finite partition of X , P = {Ai|i ≤ I}, Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ (i 6= j),
⋃
iAi = X ,
also called a coarse-graining, yields a symbolic dynamics (Lind and Marcus 1995) of
the system (X,Φ) in the following way: Taking the finite index set of the partition
as an alphabet A of cardinality I, one assigns to each initial condition x0 ∈ X a
bi-infinite sequence s = . . . ai
−1
ai0 .ai1ai2 . . . of symbols aik ∈ A according to the
rule x0 7→ s, if Φt(x0) ∈ Ait , t ∈ Z (the dot indicates the origin of the time
2The relationship between C∗- and W∗-algebras can be illustrated in the following way. Regard-
ing a C∗-algebra A as a complex vector space one can construct the dual A∗ of linear functionals
containing the states over A. This is again a vector space that becomes a Hilbert space in the GNS
construction and has a dual A∗∗. The original C∗-algebra A can be canonically embedded in A∗∗
by a(ρ) = ρ(a) where ρ ∈ A∗, the right-hand side a ∈ A, and the left-hand side a ∈ A∗∗. Hence,
A
∗∗ inherits the properties of A (including the C∗-property). The fact that it has a Hilbert space
as its predual turns it into a W∗-algebra. The bidual A∗∗ is generally much larger than A and
contains the epistemic observables.
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scale). This mapping s = π(x0) is continuous in the topology of the space of
sequences Σ = AZ. Accordingly, the first iterate x1 = Φ(x0) of x0 is mapped
onto the sequence s′ = . . . ai
−1
ai0ai1 .ai2 . . .. Therefore, the sequence s
′ is obtained
by shifting all symbols of s one place to the left.
A symbolic dynamical system is given by (Σ, σ) where σ(s) = s′ is the left-
shift. Since the dynamics on Σ is trivially represented by the shift σ, all important
information is now encoded in the structure of the symbolic sequences s. Therefore,
symbolic dynamics deals with syntax and pattern analysis (Lind and Marcus 1995,
Keller and Wittfeld 2004, Steuer et al. 2004, Steuer et al. 2001).
The systems (X,Φ) and (Σ, σ) are related to each other by
π ◦ Φ = σ ◦ π , (1)
which can be represented diagrammatically as:
❄ ❄
✲
✲s σ(s)
x Φ(x)
π π
σ
Φ
where π : X → Σ acts as an intertwiner. If π is continuous and invertible and
its inverse π−1 is also continuous, the maps Φ and σ are topologically equivalent.
In this case the partition P is called generating. For generating partitions, the
correspondence between the phase space and the symbolic representation is one-
to-one: each point in phase space is uniquely represented by a bi-infinite symbolic
sequence and vice versa. Additionally, all topological information is preserved.
Generating partitions are generally hard to find. However, it is known that
hyperbolic systems possess generating partitions for which the resulting symbolic
dynamics is a Markov chain (Sinai 1968a,b, Bowen 1970). The partitions that
achieve this are so-called Markov partitions. The symbolic dynamics obtained from
a Markov partition is a shift of finite type. This can be seen by defining an I ×
I stochastic matrix Pij = µ(Φ
−1(Ai) ∩ Aj)/µ(Ai) (Froyland 2001), where µ is a
probability measure. The associated transition matrix Tij = sgn (Pij) provides a
subset ΣT ⊂ Σ of admissible sequences. The sequence s = . . . ai
−1
ai0 .ai1ai2 . . .
belongs to ΣT if Tai
k
ai
k+1
= 1 (i.e. the transition from aik to aik+1 is allowed). The
left-shift restricted to ΣT yields then a subshift of finite type (ΣT , σ|ΣT ).
Assume that a coarse-grained description of a dynamical system (X,Φ) is such a
shift of finite type (ΣT , σ|ΣT ). Then we can distinguish two important cases. In the
first case, either the matrix T itself or some power T l (l > 1) of T is diagonal. If T is
diagonal, the cells Ai of the partition P are invariant sets under the flow Φ. That is,
the partition is coarse enough to capture the asymptotically stable fixed points and
limit tori together with their basins of attraction of a multistable dynamical system.
Such systems are structurally stable unless they give rise to bifurcations. If the
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l-th power of T is diagonal, the admissible sequences of the symbolic dynamics are
periodic and T is called cyclic. This means that the boundaries of the partition are
transversally intersected by a limit torus, which is asymptotically stable as well. The
space of symbolic sequences ΣT for these systems can be equipped with invariant,
ergodic measures by taking Dirac measures for the periodic sequences.
The second important case refers to an irreducible transition matrix T , i.e. there
is a number l such that T l is positive. Then the corresponding shift of finite type
(ΣT , σ|ΣT ) is an ergodic and mixing Markov chain where the eigenvector p
∗ to eigen-
value one of the stochastic matrix P corresponds to a unique invariant, ergodic
measure that is mixing in addition to the first case above (Ruelle 1968, 1989). A
well-elaborated theory relates these measures to KMS states in algebraic quantum
statistics (Olesen and Petersen 1978, Bratteli and Robinson 1997, Pinzari et al.
2000, Exel 2004), at least for structurally stable hyperbolic systems. Such systems
have Markov partitions enabling the construction of thermal equilibrium KMS states
(under certain conditions) which are also structurally stable (Robinson 1999). Fur-
thermore, Markov partitions are generating and, thereby, admit a symbolic dynamics
that is topologically equivalent to the underlying phase space dynamics.
To conclude, subshifts of finite type (ΣT , σ|ΣT ), characterized by an I × I tran-
sition matrix T , are structurally stable if T is either cyclic (i.e. there is an l ≥ 1
such that T l is diagonal) or if T is irreducible. In both cases, the existence of
invariant and ergodic measures ensure stability conditions as required for the con-
textual emergence of epistemic observables and associated states in a partitioned
phase space.
3 Contextual Emergence of Mental States
from Neural States
Let us now consider a neurodynamical system N = (X,Φ) with phase space X
described by neural observables fi : X → R (e.g. spike rates or action poten-
tials or somato-dendritic membrane potentials of neurons) such that x ∈ X is a
point or, likewise, an activation vector of a neural population given by the values
(fi(x))i≤n ∈ R
n for n degrees of freedom. In the following subsections we address
three different ways of introducing epistemic observables on such a phase space. The
structural stability of their associated symbolic dynamics, which is of key significance
for contextual emergence, will be emphasized in particular.
3.1 Neural Correlates of Consciousness
There is a great variety of conscious mental states forming a mental state space Y .
Mental states range from coarsest-grained (“just being conscious”) to finer-grained
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states such as wakefulness versus sleep, dreaming, hypnosis, attentiveness, etc.3
Even more refined are states of consciousness associated with specific phenomenal
content (Chalmers 2000).
It is generally assumed that some neural system N with phase space X is cor-
related with particular mental states C ∈ Y . They can be related to epistemic
observables p : X → {0, 1}, where p(x) = 1 if the activation vector x is actually cor-
related with the mental state C. A phenomenal family P = {C1, . . . CI} is a Boolean
classification of pairwise disjoint states that cover the whole mental state space Y
(Chalmers 2000). In other words, P provides a partition of the mental state space Y
into I states Ci. The whole mental state space can then be represented by a system
of such partitions of different coarse grainings: At the lowest level there is a binary
partition defining mental states of “being conscious” and “not being conscious”. At
subsequent levels, there are more refined partitions defining, for instance, states of
“wakefulness”, “sleep”, and altered states (e.g. hypnosis), again covering the entire
mental state space Y .
According to Chalmers (2000), a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) can
be characterized by a minimal sufficient neural subsystem N that is correlated with
a conscious state C ∈ Y . This characterization refers to the interlevel relation of
supervenience. The sufficiency of N means that the activity of N implies being in
conscious state C.
From the point of view of this contribution, however, it is also appropriate to
look for a necessary neural subsystem N whose activation is correlated with the
conscious state C in the sense of contextual emergence. Being in a conscious state
C implies the activity of N , so that this activity is a necessary condition for C.
Suppose that N is an NCC for a conscious state Ci ∈ P with multiple realizations
by different activation patterns of N . Then different neural states, x, y ∈ X , are
sufficient for the conscious state Ci. Since pi(x) = pi(y), x and y are epistemically
indistinguishable from one another and, hence, epistemically equivalent with respect
to the observable pi corresponding to the mental state Ci ∈ P. In this sense,
the partition P of the mental state space Y induces a partition Q = {A1, . . . AI}
of the neural state space X into classes of epistemically equivalent neural states.
Labeling the cells Ai of Q by symbols ai of a finite alphabet A, we obtain a symbolic
representation of the mental states, emerging from the neural state space by the
mapping π : P → A, π(Ci) = ai. The dynamics of states ai in A is a discrete
sequence of symbols as a function of time, establishing a symbolic dynamics. If the
transitions between states of consciousness can be described by an I × I transition
matrix T , the mental symbolic dynamics is of finite type.
A coarse-grained partition of X implies neighborhood relations between states
in Y that are different from those in the underlying neural phase space X ; in this
3A recent empirically based study concerning the relation between neural and mental state
space representations for wakefulness versus sleep and other, subtler examples (selective attention,
intrinsic perceptual selection) is due to Fell (2004). For alternative state space approaches see
Wackermann (1999) and Hobson et al. (2000), and the following subsection.
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sense it implies a change of topology. Also, the algebra of mental observables differs
from that of neurobiological observables. Obviously, these two differences depend
essentially on the choice of the contextual partition of Y , based on the choice of a
phenomenal family, inducing the partition of X . We will now show that a particular
concept of stability is crucial for a proper choice of such a partition and, thus, crucial
for a properly conceived relation between X and Y .
The crucial demand for contextual emergence is that the equivalence classes of
neural states in X and, hence, the mental states in Y be structurally stable (in the
sense of Sec. 2) under the dynamics in X . Consider, e.g., the partition of Y into the
mental states “wakefulness” and “sleep” leading to two disjoint sets in X . Given an
appropriate discretization of time, the transition matrix T is cyclic with T 2 = E (E
denoting the 2× 2 unit matrix). That is, the coarse-grained description provides a
limit torus. By contrast, a sufficiently fine-grained partition of Y into mental states
of different phenomenal content would have to be described by a high-dimensional
irreducible transition matrix T since any such state should be connected to any
other state by a symbolic trajectory of sufficient length. In this case the resulting
symbolic dynamics is an ergodic, mixing Markov chain with a distinguished KMS
equilibrium state (Pinzari et al. 2000, Exel 2004).
These stationary and structurally stable symbolic dynamical systems have strik-
ingly different consequences (beim Graben and Atmanspacher, in press). While
fixed points and limit tori do not possess generating partitions (beim Graben 2004),
Markov chains can be obtained from Markov partitions which are generating. Gen-
erating partitions admit a continuous approximation of individual points in the
neural phase space X by symbolic sequences in A with arbitrary precision. Hence,
the neural description in X and the coarse-grained, mental description in Y are
topologically equivalent.
This shows that the generating property of a partition is an important constraint
for a viable symbolic description of a system. Although this is a clear-cut criterion,
generating partitions are notoriously difficult to find in practice, and they are explic-
itly known for only very few examples. Nevertheless, they are viable candidates for
the implementation of a stability criterion appropriate for the contextual emergence
of mental states. A related stability constraint has been proposed recently (Wern-
ing and Maye 2004, this issue). An alternative approach, focusing on information
constraints rather than stability, is due to Shalizi and Moore (preprint).
3.2 Macroscopic Neural States
Another approach, leading to coarse-grained neural states without involving men-
tal states is based on mass potentials such as local field potentials (LFP) at the
mesoscopic and the electroencephalogram (EEG) at the macroscopic level of brain
organization. Let F : X → R be such an observable given by a mean field
F (x) =
∑
i
fi(x) , (2)
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where the sum extends over a population of n neurons and fi denotes a projector
of X onto the i-th coordinate axis measuring the microscopic activation of the i-th
neuron.
Similar to the previous subsection, the outcomes of F have multiple realizations
since the terms in the sum in Eq. (2) can be arranged arbitrarily. Therefore, two
neural activation vectors x, y can lead to the same value F (x) = F (y) (e.g. when
fi(x) − ǫ = fj(x) + ǫ, i 6= j), so that they are indistinguishable by means of F
and, therefore, epistemically equivalent. If the equivalence classes of F in X form
a finite partition Q = {A1, . . .AI} of X , we can again assign symbols ai from an
alphabet A to the cells Ai and obtain a symbolic dynamics. In this way, exper-
imentally well-defined meso- and macroscopic brain observables, LFP and EEG,
form a coarse-grained description of the underlying microscopic neurodynamics. It
should be emphasized that related approaches do not involve any reference to con-
crete mental or conscious states. Whether or not one wants to relate corresponding
coarse-grained neural states to mental states is left open (for attempts in this direc-
tion, see Fell (2004), Wackermann (1999) and Hobson et al. (2000)).
Coarse-grainings based on the symbolic encoding of EEG time series became
increasingly popular in recent years (Keller and Wittfeld 2004, beim Graben et al.
2000, Frisch et al. 2004, Frisch and beim Graben 2005, Drenhaus et al., in press,
Schack 2004, Steuer et al. 2004). Since such partitions are not induced by well-
defined mental observables, it is unclear whether the stability conditions required
for contextual emergence are satisfied. It is, thus, particularly important to check
this carefully.
One option to do this is to look for Markov partitions of the phase space which
minimize correlations between their cells, thus creating a Markov process for the
symbolic dynamics of the meso- or macro- observables if the dynamics in X is
chaotic.4 Since Markov partitions are generating, they can be operationally identi-
fied by the fact that the dynamical entropy for a generating partition is the supre-
mum over all possible partitions, the so-called Kolomogorov-Sinai entropy (see At-
manspacher (1997) for an annotated introduction). Iterative partitioning algorithms
in this and similar contexts have been discussed by Froyland (2001): Starting with
an initial partition, those sets which contribute to the greatest mass of the assumed
invariant ergodic measure are refined iteratively. Optimal partitions are thereby
generated by a dynamics in “partition space”.
Alternatively, the measured meso- or macroscopic observables can be analyzed
by segmentation techniques (Lehmann et al. 1987, Wackermann et al. 1993, Hobson
et al. 2000, Hutt 2004, Schack 2004).5 A recent proposal to implement this is due to
Froyland (2005): One tries to partition the space X into almost invariant sets such
4Evidence for chaotic brain processes has often been reported (cf. Kaneko and Tsuda 2000, and
references therein).
5Lehmann et al. (1987) called the corresponding states “brain microstates” or “atoms of
thought”, expressing the suggestion that they correspond to elementary “chunks” of conscious-
ness.
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that trajectories spend most of the time within individual cells of the partition, and
transitions between cells are likely at larger time scales. In this way, the dynamics
on short time scales is described by cyclic transition matrices, whereas large time
scales yield descriptions by Markov processes with irreducible transition matrices.
The separation of time scales provides, then, a contextual criterion for properly
defined macroscopic brain states.
3.3 Remarks on Symbol Grounding
The symbol grounding problem posed by Harnad (1990) refers to the problem of as-
signing meaning to symbols on purely syntactic grounds, as proposed by cognitivists
such as Fodor and Pylyshin (1988). This entails the question of how conscious men-
tal states with phenomenal content can be characterized by their NCC. Chalmers
(2000) defined an NCC for phenomenal content as a neural system N with “sys-
tematicity in the correlation”, meaning that the representation of a content in N is
correlated with a representation of that content in consciousness. In other words,
there should be a mapping from the neural state space X onto the space of con-
scious states Y such that regions in X are related to phenomenal contents in Y . This
mapping differs from the mapping required for contextual emergence as discussed
in Sec. 3.1. For a neural representation of content further constraints are crucial.
First, all states in B ⊂ X representing the same content C should be similar
in some respect: there should be a mapping g : X → X , let us call it a gauge
transformation, such that B is invariant under g, g(B) ⊂ B. In this sense, g is
a similarity transformation. On the other hand, graded differences in phenomenal
similarity should be reflected by topologically neighboring regions in phase space.
One would, therefore, require the mapping g to be a homeomorphism, leading to
topographic mappings of contents (Chalmers 2000).
A second requirement is the compositionality of representations (Fodor and
Pylyshin 1988, Werning and Maye 2004). Compositionality refers to the relation
between syntax and semantics insofar as the meaning of a composed (or “complex”)
symbol is a function of the meanings of its constituent symbols and the way they are
put together. A prerequisite for compositionality is the existence of syntactic rules
determining which composites are constituents of a language and which are not.
(In our approach, constituents are admissible (sub-)sequences in the corresponding
symbolic dynamics (beim Graben 2004).)
According to Harnad, these constraints need to be combined with his proposal
that symbols must be grounded in embodied cognition. They represent objects or
facts from the environments of physically embodied agents that collect information
by their sensory apparatuses and act by their motor effectors. While Harnad (1990)
suggests a hybrid architecture consisting of a neural network as an invariance de-
tector and a classical symbol processor to meet the compositionality constraint, we
shall discuss the alternative of a unified neurodynamical system.
This can be achieved using the notion of conceptual spaces as discussed by
11
Ga¨rdenfors (2004). A conceptual space is a vector space spanned by quantitative
observables. The conceptual space for color, e.g., can be constructed as the three-
dimensional RGB coordinate system or an equivalent representation supplied by the
cones in the retina (Steels and Belpaeme in press). According to Ga¨rdenfors (2004)
a natural concept is then a convex region in a conceptual space such that all ele-
ments in that region are similar in a particular context. Implementing conceptual
spaces by neural systems, we arrive again at partitions of neurodynamical phase
spaces. The idea of gauge invariance yields partitions of finest grain, corresponding
to “natural kinds” (Carnap 1928/2003, Quine 1969), that might be too refined for
other contexts.
Such contexts can be supplied by pragmatic accounts. Suppose a toy-world in
which only orange objects are eatable, and all other objects are not (Steels and
Belpaeme in press). Then, a binary partition of color space into “orange” and
“non-orange” will be sufficient for an agent to survive. Thus, survival (or success-
ful communication) serve as contextual constraints for the emergence of cognitive
symbols. Symbol grounding corresponds then to categorization of conceptual spaces
driven by pragmatic goals.
The contextual emergence of symbols in partitioned conceptual spaces raises
the question of the stability of the symbols. The dynamics that has to be taken
into account now is, however, not neurodynamics but rather sociodynamics: the
evolution of populations of cognitive agents. (Neurodynamically, concepts are static
objects given by the cells of a partition.) An interesting approach in this sense
has been developed within the framework of evolutionary game theory (Steels and
Belpaeme, in press, Ja¨ger 2004, van Rooy 2004). In these models the phase space
is spanned by the population numbers of agents with competing strategies. The
outcome of the games is assessed by a utility function which in turn determines the
number of offspring of the players. In cognitive applications of evolutionary game
theory, offspring means adoption of the winning strategy by other players.
If categories or concepts are given by partitions of conceptual spaces, competing
strategies are different partitions of the same local conceptual spaces shared by differ-
ent agents. Evolutionary game theory then describes a dynamics in partition space
similar to the search for optimal partitions by iterative algorithms (Froyland 2001).
Evolutionary stable strategies are asymptotically stable fixed points in evolutionary
game theory (Ja¨ger 2004). This stability criterion means that cultural evolution
grounds symbols in shared partitions of local conceptual spaces of cognitive agents.
The structural stability of dynamically evolving partitions can be illustrated by
the “naming game” (van Rooy 2004). When a categorization in conceptual space is
fixed the cells are labeled by symbols of an alphabet A. This can be done arbitrarily
by convention, or it can be achieved by another pragmatic game that optimizes the
utility reward. For instance, assume that two meanings m1, m2 assign two symbolic
forms f1, f2, that m1 is less complex than m2, and the same for the forms f1, f2. For
such a scenario, van Rooy (2004) found only two evolutionarily stable strategies: the
Horn strategy which assigns more complex forms to more complex meanings, and
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the anti-Horn strategy performing otherwise. Since the basin of attraction of the
Horn strategy is larger than that of the anti-Horn strategy (Ja¨ger 2004), the Horn
strategy provides a higher degree of structural stability.
4 Compatibility of Psychological Descriptions
It is an old and much discussed question whether and, if yes, how psychology could
become a unified science, integrating the many approaches and models that con-
stitute its contemporary situation. It is often argued that the largely fragmented
appearance of psychology (and cognitive science as well) is due to the fact that
psychology is still in a preparadigmatic, “immature” state. Some have even argued
that this situation is unavoidable (e.g., Koch 1983, Gardner 1992) and should be
considered as the strength of psychology (e.g., Viney 1989, McNally 1992) rather
than an undesirable affair.
From the perspective of the philosophy of mind, arguments against the possibility
of a unified science of psychology have been presented as well. Most prominent
are the accounts of Kim (1992, 1993) and Fodor (1997), both using the scheme of
multiple realization in the framework of supervenience to reject unification. Shapiro
(in press) has recently pointed out particular weak points in their arguments.
On the other hand, there is a growing interest in articulating visions for a unified
science of psychology, cognition, or consciousness (see, e.g., Newell 1990, Anderson
1996). Recently, various approaches have been proposed to reach a degree of coher-
ence comparable to established sciences as, e.g., physics with well-defined relations
between its different disciplines. Examples are approaches such as “psychological
behaviorism” (Staats 1996, 1999), “unified psychology” (Sternberg and Grigorenko
2001, Sternberg et al. 2001), and the “tree of knowledge system” (Henriques 2003).
A key feature in the latter program is the commensurability of competing approaches
in psychology, explicated by Yanchar and Slife (1997) and Slife (2000).
This section presents a way in which the notion of commensurable models can
be implemented in a formally rigorous fashion. A suitable way to formulate com-
mensurability in technical terms is related to the concept of compatibility. Briefly
speaking, two models are considered as commensurable if they are compatible in
the sense that there exist well-defined mappings between them. If this is not the
case, they are incompatible. It turns out that the scheme of contextual emergence
provides some detailed and clarifying insights how to proceed in this regard. The
two levels of description whose interlevel relations are significant for this purpose are
those of neurobiology and psychology or cognitive science, respectively. Compatible
and incompatible implementations of cognitive symbol systems have recently been
discussed by beim Graben (2004).
A key result of the work by beim Graben and Atmanspacher (in press) is that
a non-generating partition is incompatible with any other partition (even if this
is generating) in the sense that there is no well-defined mapping between the par-
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titions.6 As a consequence, models based on such partitions are incompatible as
well. Since any ad hoc chosen partition is quite unlikely to be generating, it may be
suspected that the resulting incompatibility of models based on such partitions is
the rule rather than the exception. While incompatibility may admit the possibil-
ity of “partially coherent” models, the case of maximal incompatibility, also called
complementarity, excludes any coherence between different models completely.
At this point it should be clear that our notion of incompatibility is more subtle
than a “logical incompatibility” (Slife 2000) in the sense that two models are sim-
ply negations of each other. Also, it would be interesting to compare Slife’s (2000)
complementary models with our formal approach in terms of maximally incompat-
ible models, which are basically incoherent only in a Boolean framework. From a
perspective admitting non-Boolean descriptions, the notion of coherence acquires a
more comprehensive meaning, including complementary descriptions as representa-
tions of an underlying, more general description (see Primas 1977).
With these remarks in mind, incompatible models due to non-generating parti-
tions represent a significant limit to the vision of a unified or integrative science of
psychology. Or, turned positively, such a unification will be strongly facilitated if the
approaches to be unified are based on generating, hence compatible, partitions that
are structurally stable and induced by well-defined mental or cognitive states. As
mentioned, it is a tedious task to identify such generating partitions. Nevertheless,
the necessary formal and numerical tools are available today and significantly facili-
tated by the symbolic description using shifts of finite type and transition matrices.
All one has to do is find transitions between mental states that are irreducible,
yielding a stationary, ergodic, and mixing Markov chain with distinguished KMS
states.
If there is a good deal of empirical plausibility for a particular partition, one
might hope that this implies that such a partition is generating (at least in an ap-
proximate sense) and, thus, that the corresponding mental or cognitive states are
stable (in the sense of the KMS condition). However, there may be cases of con-
flict between the empirical and the theoretical constraint on a proper partition. In
such cases, one has to face the possibility that the “empirical plausibility” of cog-
nitive states may be unjustified, e.g. based on questionable prejudices. If cognitive
states turn out to be dynamically unstable, this theoretical argument against their
adequacy is very strong indeed.
Compatible partitions and, consequently, compatible psychological models show
another important feature that is occasionally addressed in current literature: the
topological equivalence of representations in neurodynamic and mental state spaces
(cf. Metzinger 2003, p. 619, and Fell (2004) for empirically based examples). Topo-
logical equivalence ensures that the mapping between X and Y is faithful in the
sense that the two state space representations yield equivalent information about
6Two partitions P1 and P2 are (in)compatible if their σ-algebras are (not) identical up to µ-
measure zero. Two partitions are maximally incompatible, or complementary, if their σ-algebras
are disjoint up to the entire phase space X (cf. beim Graben and Atmanspacher, in press).
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the system (see Sec. 2). Non-generating, incompatible partitions do not provide
representations in Y that are topologically equivalent with the underlying represen-
tation in X .
5 Summary
The relation between mental states and neural states is discussed in the framework
of a recently proposed scheme of interlevel relations called contextual emergence.
According to this proposal, knowledge of the neural description provides necessary
but not sufficient conditions for a proper psychological description. Sufficient condi-
tions can be defined as contingent contexts at the cognitive (phenomenal) level and
implemented as stability criteria at the underlying neural level.
This procedure has been demonstrated using the terminology of symbolic dynam-
ics at the cognitive level. Equivalence classes of neural states are defined as neural
correlates of mental states represented symbolically. Mental states are well-defined
if criteria of temporal and structural stability are satisfied for their neural corre-
lates. These criteria can be implemented either by generating or, more specifically,
Markov partitions; or by partitions of asymptotically stable fixed points or limit
tori. This implies that proper mental or cognitive states must satisfy appropriate
stability conditions.
If this is not explicitly taken care of for chaotic systems admitting generating
partitions, one has to expect that ad hoc selected partitions are not generating. As
a consequence, models based on such partitions are incompatible. This may be a
possible source of the long-standing problem of how to develop a unified science of
psychology. Only for carefully chosen generating partitions it can be guaranteed that
different cognitive models are compatible and, hence, can have transparent relations
with respect to each other.
Moreover, psychological (or cognitive) models are topologically equivalent with
their neurobiological basis only if they are constructed from generating partitions.
Without cognitive contexts serving as sufficient conditions for compatibility and
topological equivalence, the neurobiological level of description provides only neces-
sary conditions for psychological descriptions.
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